INTRODUCTION
Discovering that the United States government has experimented on unwitting and un-consenting American citizens is a difficult pill to swallow, especially when some of those American citizens are United States Armed Forces service members. This scenario begs the question: what happens now? Now that the U.S. government has finished its classified experimentation, where does this leave the soldier who wanted to defend and serve his country, but is now a victim of his government? Where does this leave "the happy warrior"? 2 This paper will explore the top-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) human medical experiment, MKULTRA, and the possible avenues of relief for service members involved in the project. First, the veteran may bring suit against the U.S. government for constitutional violations, or in a civil tort action. However, due to the evolution of the doctrine and cases such as Chappell v. Wallace, United States v. Stanley, and Feres v. United States, veterans will likely be unable to recover a remedy in court. 3 Second, a veteran may recover under the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) disability compensation system. 4 Serviceconnected disability compensation is a monthly, monetary benefit paid to a veteran upon a showing to the VA that the veteran was disabled due to an injury arising out of, or aggravated by, their active-duty military service. 5 However, a veteran used as an unwitting test subject in MKULTRA would have a difficult time surmounting the burden of proof the VA system requires. But given recent court decisions, namely AZ v. Shinseki, it may be possible to alleviate some of the veteran's burden of proof involving MKULTRA claims. 6 This article will take a brief look into the history of human medical trials, followed by a history of the CIA program MKULTRA, and other related programs. Next, it will explore case law that bars veterans from constitutional remedies as well as tort remedies against the U.S. government. Finally, the article will discuss challenges for veterans in the VA disability compensation system to determine if MKULTRA victims could successfully seek service-connection. Ultimately, a veteran attempting to recover damages from MKULTRA testing will likely be unable to prevail under a constitutional analysis, but an MKULTRA victim may be able to seek service-connection under the VA. 2 See Read, supra note 1. 3 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICAL ETHICS
Throughout the course of American history, science has demanded discovery. However, when answering the call of duty, scientists, whether privately-funded or government-sponsored, have frequently tested drug technologies on humans. 7 During the 1960s, the United States began scrutinizing how scientists were acquiring their information, and a new change in physician ethics emerged. 8 The evolution called for new ideals regarding informed consent. 9 To comply, the National Institute of Health (NIH) issued a new clinical manual requiring informed consent. 10 Unfortunately, the manual did not provide a precise definition of the term. 11 However, it did require a volunteer to sign a statement prior to participating in the medical trial, asserting the volunteer "understand [ The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) followed suit, although it defined informed consent as "the person [having] the ability to exercise choice."
13 It further required the person "receive a 'fair explanation' of the procedure, including an understanding of the experiment's purpose and duration, 'all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected,' the nature of a controlled trial (and the possibility of going on a placebo), and any existing alternative forms of therapy available." 14 The spark of this "most remarkable-and thoroughly controversial-transformation" was media coverage of various private medical trials. 15 In 1962, one example caught the attention of Congress and the media when a drug, not yet evaluated by the FDA, was given "on an experimental basis" to women at risk for complications such as "spontaneous abortion" and "premature 7 See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 1 (1991). 8 Id. at 88-89. 9 Id. at 89. 10 Id. at 91. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 92. 13 Id. at 93. 14 Id. 15 Id. at 1; see also id. at 74. One study, for example, occurred in an institution for mentally ill children where a mild form of hepatitis was endemic. Id. The existing presence of the virus was used as grounds for artificially introducing the hepatitis virus to other children in the home. Id. When the study was publicized, it was described as "risk[ing]… injury… for the benefit of others." Id. delivery." 16 The drug was taken by 20,000 American women, which included 3,750 women of childbearing age and 624 pregnant women. 17 However, these women did not know they were part of an experimental drug testing program and, as such, had not given informed consent. 18 Thereafter, a Senator from New York, Jacob Javits, proposed an amendment to the Kefauver Bill, which enabled pharmaceutical medication testing for safety and efficacy, to compel: the secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to issue regulations that no such [experimental] drug may be administered to any human being in any clinical investigation unless . . . that human being has been appropriately advised that such drug has not been determined to be safe in use for human beings. 19 However, Senator Javits' amendment to the bill was not successful.
20
Almost a decade later, Congress again discovered a grave miscarriage of ethical considerations. In 1972, the Tuskegee syphilis experiments became known to the public.
21
Initiated by the U.S. Public Health Service, the Tuskegee syphilis program began in 1932, and it focused on African-American men from the South who were believed to be "particularly susceptible to venereal diseases."
22 Over 600 men were recruited, two-thirds of which were given the live syphilis virus. 23 Although the participants were told they were being treated for "bad blood," they received "painful diagnostic procedures" that would implant and grow syphilis, rather than treat it. 24 The men involved also received mercury treatments that eased the symptoms of syphilis. 25 16 Id. at 63-64. 17 Id. at 64. 18 Id. 19 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Id. at 64, 66-67 (explaining that the Javits amendment, once it merged from the legislature, required consent "except where [investigators] deem it not feasible or, in their best professional judgment, contrary to the best interests of such human beings," essentially leaving consent up to the discretion of researchers). 21 KELLY BARTH, HUMAN MEDICAL TRIALS 25 (2005). 22 Id. at 11-12. 23 Id. at 26, 40. 24 Id. at 12 (citation omitted). Also note that, beginning in the 1940s, penicillin could have been used to treat syphilis, but none of the participants were given penicillin for treatment. See id. 25 Id.
The Tuskegee study lasted for forty years. 26 While the men received only $25.00 for participating in the program, the Tuskegee victims received a collective settlement of ten million dollars in 1974. 27 Then, in 1997, President Bill Clinton formally apologized to the victims and their families for the "clearly racist" study that was "orchestrated" by the federal government.
28
Despite these events, the medical community is still debating the topic of informed consent today. For example, in 2009, the Gardasil vaccine received serious backlash regarding its efficacy and safety. 29 One of the top researchers of Gardasil and HPV vaccinations, Dr. Diane Harper, came out against the drug, stating that "the benefit to public health is nothing, there is no reduction in cervical cancers." 30 While Merck, the drug's manufacturer, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have stated that adequate warnings, such as "soreness at the injection site and risk of fainting after vaccination" are provided, questions remain whether more might be necessary. 31 Further, while no link is established, girls that received the vaccination have had episodes of blood clots, developed Lou Gehrig's Disease (ALS), and even died. last long enough to provide a cancer protection benefit, and that its risks-'small but real'-could occur more often than the cervical cancer itself would." 36 Therefore, while Gardasil is still available on the market and encouraged for young girls and women, there are important details not widely known about this vaccine. Clearly the notion of informed consent has made significant advancements since World War II, but whether informed consent has evolved far enough within the medical community is unclear.
III.
THE HISTORY OF MKULTRA Beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through the next three decades, the U.S. military and the CIA initiated programs to study human behavior.
37
Many of the programs, specifically MKULTRA, were initiated as a retaliatory effort because of fears that the Soviet Union was "engaged in intensive efforts to produce LSD."
38
The research conducted and sponsored by the CIA would give the agency an understanding of "the mechanisms by which these substance[s] worked and how their effects could be defeated." 39 The U.S. Navy initiated Project Chatter in 1947. 40 The program tested the use of drugs for their utility in interrogation and recruitment. 41 Drugs such as anabasis uphylla, scopolamine, and mescaline were used on humans to "determine their speech-inducing qualities."
42 Project Chatter was engaged throughout the Korean War, and it was terminated in 1953. 43 In 1950, Project Bluebird was approved and initiated by the CIA. 44 Bluebird had several objectives, among them "conditioning personnel to prevent unauthorized extraction of information," controlling persons in interrogations, "memory enhancement," and "preventing hostile control of Agency personnel." 45 MKULTRA had three different phases of research: "first, the search for materials suitable for study; second, laboratory testing on voluntary human subjects in various types of institutions; third, the application of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings."
56 While substances to experiment with were not difficult to discover, how and where did the CIA find "voluntary" subjects to test the use of mindaltering drugs? The answer to that question, obviously, is where numerous people were stripped of their resolve and autonomynamely, hospitals and prisons. 57 The first study was initiated in the National Institute of Mental Health, and tested drugs and hallucinogens on patients (usually prisoners) at the Addiction Research Center. 58 This center essentially became "a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drug violations," in that the CIA then subjected the drug offenders to drug use in order to monitor hallucinogenic effects. 59 Although the Congressional Report states that these "test subjects were volunteer prisoners," it also says that only a physical test and a general consent form were required before administering these mind altering drugs.
60
Were there any psychological evaluations? Was history of prior substance abuse taken into account? Did it matter how long a prisoner 52 Id. at 70. 53 Id. at 4, 70. 54 Id. at 13. 55 Id. at 13-14. 56 Id. at 70. 57 Id. at 71. 58 Id. 59 Id. 60 Id.
had been drug-free before asking them to "volunteer" to be fed government drugs?
The CIA did not seem particularly troubled with these questions, and eventually admitted to using LSD in "surreptitious administration of unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings." 61 The CIA began this program to research the "full pattern of reaction" on various test subjects, including "individuals at all social levels, high and low, Native American and foreign." 62 The information gathered from MKULTRA was used for "harassment, discrediting, or disabling persons" in interrogation settings. 63 However, not only did the CIA discover an interest in the effects of LSD, the U.S. Army began its own experimentations. 64 The Army tested LSD on three different groups of soldiers:
In the first [group], LSD was administered to more than 1,000 American soldiers who volunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments. In the second phase . . . 95 volunteers received LSD in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of the drug. In the third phase, . . . 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjects were interrogated after receiving LSD as part of operational field tests.
65
It appeared MKULTRA's experimentation knew no bounds, and in the 1977 Congressional Hearing, Admiral Turner testified on the known extent of the program. 66 Despite widespread document destruction after the program ended, Admiral Turner claimed he was working closely with the Attorney General to identify the individuals used as unwitting test subjects, since names were not recorded. 67 However, when asked whether he could provide a list of all individuals involved and whether they were voluntary or involuntarily subjects, Admiral Turner responded that he could. 68 He does not, however, explain how he could provide such a list without knowledge of their identity.
69 Senator Kennedy posed the next question to the Admiral: 61 Id. 62 Id. (citation omitted). 63 Id. 64 Id. at 11, 72. 65 Id. at 72. 66 Id. at 4-5. 67 Id. at 86. 68 Id. at 36. 69 Id.
"It is your intention to notify the individuals who have been the subjects of the research . . . ?" 70 The Admiral simply answered yes, so Senator Kennedy pushed further stating, "If you can identify them, you intend to notify them." 71 The Admiral agreed.
72
Senator Kennedy then asked whether the Admiral could identify all universities and research centers that were involved; again, the Admiral answered in the affirmative. 73 While Senator Kennedy wanted these institutions named, the Admiral stated policy reasons for non-disclosure, including the facilities' reputations. 74 However, the Admiral stated that he "already notified one institution because the involvement was so extensive that I thought they really needed to protect themselves . . . ."
75
Although the Admiral provided no additional information on the identity of the university, it came to light that the University of Maryland President, Wilson H. Elkins, received a letter from the Department of the Army, dated October 14, 1975, two years prior to the Congressional Hearing. 76 The letter sought information regarding any follow-up studies that the university had conducted on its own, and whether it could provide information on individual test subjects and members of the university involved.
77 President Elkin's response stated that "the contract with the Army Medical Research and Development Command and the University of Maryland stipulated that the studies were Secret, so that all records were either turned over the Army or destroyed."
78 However, Elkins provided three names of personnel at the University of Maryland who were involved. 79 Indeed, one such faculty member, Walter Weintraub, the Director of Graduate Education for the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, wrote numerous articles regarding drug 70 Id. 71 In a Board of Regents meeting, President Elkins noted that the CIA accused the university of providing money to conduct MKULTRA research. 83 However, Elkins stated that, although the CIA may have record of a $3,750 grant in 1956 for "study of the effect of blood vessels of certain camphoric acid derivatives," the university received the grant from "a private organization." 84 Elkins stated that the "University had no indication [the] CIA was the source of the funds," and that the "University had no other direct or indirect involvement with Project MKULTRA." 85 However, the University of Maryland has yet to find this 1977 letter about MKULTRA funding from the CIA. 86 Indeed, the only record of the letter is Elkin's reference to it in the Board of Regents meeting. 87 Other documents relating to MKULTRA have been slowly released by the CIA, one page at a time. In 1998, the CIA's Office of General Counsel released a letter (with names redacted), dated October 3, 1977, which was addressed to the California Medical Facility. 88 The letter included documents to address the extent of the facility's involvement and stated: 80 These materials are in the same form in which they have been made available to the public except that, in order to allow you to judge the nature and extent of the Facility's involvement, the name of the Facility and SIMPR have been reinserted wherever they appear in the original documents. 89 Then, in 2002, the CIA released an account of funds to institutions regarding the projects and budgets. 90 The latest release, from 2006, is an office memorandum labeled "Notes for DDCI" (Deputy Director of Central Intelligence), dated August 3, 1964. 91 The drafting party has been redacted and includes three points, but only the last is pertinent:
We are holding the papers for your session with the Director, et. al, today on MKSEARCH, the program for testing exotic drugs on unwitting Americans. A presession with Helms, Gottlieb, and Earman is tentatively scheduled for 2:00 today for a meeting with the DCI at 2:30. Since the DCI has a 1:00 lunch appointment with the President, this may all slip, but I will keep track of it today. 92 Id. 93 Id. Though difficult to read in the original, the last word appears to be "sensitive." 94 Project MKULTRA, supra note 37, at 13-14. Here, again, the Admiral states that he has been assured "there is no evidence within the Agency of any involvement at IV.
A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM Knowing that MKULTRA existed and was used as an experimental drug program on unwitting Americans, the question becomes, what can that soldier do now? While a well-established rule would grant a lay citizen relief for a violation of the United States Constitution, such as an unreasonable search and seizure, this rule does not apply to service members with a claim against their superior officers during active duty. 95 For reasons discussed in the following cases, the Supreme Court has not found it appropriate to extend a remedy to veterans whose constitutionally protected rights were violated while in the service.
First, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Court held that a violation of the Constitution by a government actor gives rise to damages for an individual. 96 The Court relied heavily on Bell v. Hood, and stated that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."
97
Articulating the "special factors" test, the Court found there were "no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." 98 The Court implied that, without congressional intent to create a remedy, a court should not create a remedy on its own. 99 For example, the Court referenced United States v. Standard Oil, where the Court found that the case involved "federal fiscal policy," and, therefore, Congress should create the remedy, not the courts. 100 higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or specific approval." Also note that MKSEARCH was a follow-up program to MKULTRA. 95 See Bivens v. Several Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389, 396 (1971) (holding that the violation of a constitutional right by a federal agent acting under his authority gives rise to an action for damages from the constitutional violation, but that the doctrine may not be extended when "special factors" apply). But see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987) (finding that a Bivens claim is not permitted when a service member's injury stems from an action that is "incident to service"); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298, 304 (1983) (holding that "special factors" prevent service members from seeking damages for a Bivens claim). 96 The Court indicated the petitioners should have sought redress in the UCMJ instead of within the court system, and this conclusion would also support the Court's finding that "special factors" prohibited this claim.
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Due to the creation of the UCMJ, the Court decided there can be no remedy for a service member bringing claims of constitutional violations against their superior officers. The Army's purpose in secretly dosing volunteers was "to study the effects of the drug on human subjects." 
A. MKULTRA in Court Today
If another MKULTRA victim brought a claim in court today, the resolution undoubtedly would be similar to Stanley. Thus, Stanley and other similarly situated veterans cannot bring a claim against the federal government for constitutional violations. Even when Stanley attempted to distinguish himself in pivotal ways from Chappell, including that the conduct alleged was not by his superior officers, the Court nonetheless found that unwittingly dosing service members with LSD was incident to service and, therefore, Chappell and Feres barred Stanley's claim.
Despite grave violations of constitutionally protected rights, the United States Supreme Court decided that veterans may not receive a judicial remedy because it would be contrary to congressional intent. But the ultimate effect of the Supreme Court's decision is the same as stating that Congress would deny due process of the law to veterans. Even further, Congress expected that veterans who were unknowingly dosed with LSD in service should avail themselves of congressionally created remedies, such as the UCMJ.
How far must the factual scenario go to demonstrate that human experimentation is not part of the military mission and, therefore, not incident to service? Would it have been enough if Stanley knew, without a doubt, that civilians had given him LSD without his knowledge? Does it matter that Stanley did not learn of his harm until after he was discharged from the Army? What can an individual do without proof?
V. THE FERES DOCTRINE

Feres v. United
States is a landmark decision in the history of the Supreme Court. It created the Feres Doctrine, which is the main hurdle for service members and veterans recovering in a tort action against the armed forces and their superior officers. The Court in Feres looked at three different factual scenarios: the "Feres case," the "Jefferson case," and the "Griggs case." 135 In the Feres case, a soldier was in his barracks when it caught fire and killed him. 136 His estate alleged that the military was negligent in quartering the service member there when it knew, or should have known, that the barracks were "unsafe because of a defective heating plant." 137 The Jefferson case involved a service member who underwent an abdominal surgery and, eight months later, "a towel 30 inches long by 18 inches wide, marked 'Medical Department U.S. Army'" was extracted from his stomach. 138 Finally, the Griggs case dealt with issues of negligence and "unskillful medical treatment" that caused the service member's death. 139 The Court articulated the common underlying theme in all three cases: the plaintiffs were on active duty and "sustained injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 140 The Court examined whether the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 141 provided legal recourse to a service member who sustained a harm due to negligence on behalf of the armed forces when the harm was acquired "incident to the service."
142 First, the FTCA excludes recovery from "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war." 143 The Court then discussed several arguments as to why the FTCA must also bar service members' negligence claims. 144 The Court in Feres determined that there were a number of inequalities that would arise, should a service member be able to sue the armed forces.
145 Notably, noting the fact that a soldier is not able to choose his station, the Court paints a picture that a veteran could be a victim of tort law because he is forced to reside in a particular state or territory, and this is inherently unfair.
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The Court also relied on the special connection between a soldier and his command, as a distinct federal relationship between service members and the government that is "derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority." 147 The Court commented that the FTCA is a congressional exercise of power and it is intended to fit into the scope of other remedies, such as "systems of simple, 137 Id. 138 The Court looked to the Department of Veterans Affairs and its disability compensation system as the appropriate remedy, stating the VA system "normally requires no litigation [and] is not negligible or niggardly . . . ."
149 The Court also articulated that "a soldier is at peculiar disadvantage in litigation," in that the "[l]ack of time and money" and "difficulty if not impossibility of procuring witnesses" would severely affect the soldier's ability to defend himself in tort litigation.
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The important question then is whether Feres is still modern in its policy concerns. The VA system that is intended to provide a veteran with a fair and equitable remedy is no longer an efficient system. 151 Further, the information gathering for a disability compensation claim is similar to that which a veteran would have to show in a court environment. 155 Justice O'Connor postured that a MKULTRA victim should not be denied a remedy due to the government's "deliberate and calculated exposure of otherwise healthy military 148 Id. 149 Id. at 145. 150 Id. 151 See generally JACQUELINE MAFFUCCI, THE BATTLE TO END THE VA BACKLOG (2014), available at http://media.iava.org/2014BattleToEndtheVABacklog_PRINT.pdf (discussing the VA backlog that inhibits access to benefits for veterans). 152 Id. at 12-13 (describing the difficulties in collecting evidence for a claim). 153 The Feres decision relied on the fact that soldiers suffered their harm "in the course of activity incident to service." 157 However, the activities of MKULTRA did not involve service members performing in the course of duty, and, therefore, their harm could not have occurred incident to service, especially where the participants did not give informed consent. Further, as Justice O'Connor wrote in her Stanley dissent, MKULTRA was never in line with a military mission.
158 Even during the course of the program, its validity and legality were continuously questioned, 159 and the leaders of the programs ordered frequent document destruction. 160 These actions should not be understood to be in the line of duty, in line with the military mission, or in any other formulation that would excuse a claim because of the Feres Doctrine's attention to the "federal sources . . . governed by federal authority." 161 
VI. DISABILITY COMPENSATION SYSTEM
While the disability compensation system may have been efficient in the 1950s, it has been severely criticized recently for its inability to adapt and change its technological deficiencies, its 156 Id. (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 157 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) . 158 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 708-10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 159 Project MKULTRA, supra note 37, at 398. The General Counsel wrote to the Inspector General after the suicide of an unwitting victim of LSD: "I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude on the part of . . . representatives to the way this experiment was conducted . . . . I do believe, especially when human health or life is at stake, that at least the prudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to minimize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable negligence." 160 See id. at 403-04. Dr. Sidney Gottlieb spoke with the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms upon his retirement, and Gottlieb believed that "it would be a good idea if these files were destroyed." Id. at 403. Helms further remarked that "we thought we would just get rid of the files as well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would not be subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment, if you will." Id. at 403-04. Further, the Select Committee found that even prior to this document destruction by Helms and Gottlieb, "MKULTRA records were far from complete" and the Inspector General stated in 1963 that "MKULTRA record[s] appear . . . to rest in the memories of the principal officers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures." Id. at 404 n.7. 161 Feres, 340 U.S. at 144; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 2671-2680 (2014). Since even an intentional tort claim would be barred by the FTCA, it is a moot point whether the actions by the CIA and U.S. Army were negligence or battery. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2013). inaccuracy in claims processing, and its huge backlog and delay in addressing claims. 162 Currently, there are nearly 250,000 claims more than 125 days old pending at regional Veterans Affairs offices. 163 This number includes claims for original entitlement and for increased rating evaluation. 164 Although the backlog has decreased since 2013, the overall number of claims has increased and the VA system is still overburdened by the sheer volume. 165 Further, the majority of claims that are processed require adjudication, and because of the VA's effort to reduce backlog, the number of claims in the appeals process has increased. 166 Indeed, appeals have grown by nearly 17%. 167 As of September 2014, over 260,000 claims were currently in the first stages of the appeals process, and the Court of Appeals for Veteran's Claims heard and decided more than 3,800 appeals in 2013. 168 In order to be successful in a claim for service-connected disability, a veteran must show: (1) medical evidence of a current diagnosed physical or mental disability; (2) evidence of an event, injury, or disease in service; and (3) a link between his current disability and the event, injury or disease in service, usually supported by medical evidence. 169 While the VA does have a statutory duty to assist veterans in obtaining necessary evidence, 170 the burden initially falls on the veteran to collect and identify the following: (1) information from his service record as to an in service injury; (2) current medical documentation that denotes an injury in-service; and (3) current documents that correlate the two conditions (for example, a letter from a doctor reconciling the veteran's in-service injury and the current condition). 171 In proving their claims, combat veterans frequently resort to buddy statements to prove the occurrence of events or verify an in-service stressor. 172 An MKULTRA victim will likely meet only one of the necessary burdens. For example, he or she may have proof of their participation in the program, such as a letter similar to the one Stanley received. Or, he or she may have a current diagnosed condition, such as chronic paranoia or anxiety. However, they would need both, simultaneously, to proceed. Moreover, he or she would need a doctor willing to write a statement verifying that their condition was caused by LSD exposure sometime during the 1950s and 1960s.
But assume a particular victim can meet all of the burdensthat they have a current diagnosed condition, that their doctor has reviewed their military records and treatment history and is willing to write a letter stating their belief that the veteran's condition is likely related to LSD exposure in the service. Then, how will this particular veteran also prove that they were, in fact, given LSD unwittingly?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently decided a case from the Court of Appeals for Veterans' Claims that related to the burden of proof in VA claims. 173 AZ v. Shinseki involved a service-connection claim for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of sexual assault that occurred inservice. 174 However, prior adjudication denied the appellant's claim because her military service records did not contain treatment records of a sexual assault. 175 According to 38 U.S.C. § 5107:
The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 176 However, AZ is not about the appellant having documented evidence weighed against her; rather, it is about having the lack of evidence weighed against her. 177 While the statute addresses the weight of positive and negative evidence, it does not address the weight of an absence of evidence. 178 The court explained that "[t]he absence of certain evidence may be pertinent if it tends to disprove (or prove) a material fact." 179 However, in exploring the facts before it, the court found that "servicemen and servicewomen who experience in-service sexual assaults face 'unique' disincentives to report." 180 For example, servicewomen failed to report sexual assault because of "fear of retaliation or reprisals," fear of the stigma associated with reporting, or fear they would "appear weak or incapable of performing their mission." 181 The court also cited to a 2010 report from the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) that reviewed the last six years of reporting and found that less than 15% of service members who were victims of sexual assault reported the event to the military. 182 Thus, the question before the court in AZ was whether the VA could recognize a service connection for the other 85% of service members who did not report their sexual assault due to fear. 183 The Federal Circuit reviewed, in depth, the common law rules of evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence, and answered the question in the affirmative. 184 The court held that the VA can grant service connection for those victims that did not report. 185 Where no such record would have existed, the common law rules of evidence would admit the absence thereof as evidence that the transaction did not occur, if the record is one that "naturally would have been made if the transaction had occurred." 186 This common law rule of evidence has been widely adopted by lower courts. 187 It then became an exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence's hearsay rules, specifically Rule 803(7) and Rule 803(10). 188 The court stated that "both rules require for admissibility that 'a record was regularly kept' for the type of event in question." 189 Also, " [e] vidence that an entry is missing from a deficient record is inadmissible" under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 190 However, referring to Buczynski v. Shinseki 191 Further, consistent with its holding in Fagan v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit concluded evidence that does not lend positive or negative support to a veteran's claim for serviceconnection is not "pertinent evidence" as to the veteran's claim. 192 In AZ, the court found that not reporting a sexual assault, due to the nature of the crime, cannot be regarded as evidence that the assault did not occur. 193 hardly comport with a system in which 'the importance of systemic fairness and the appearance of fairness carries great weight.'" 195 
A. The Expansive Effect of AZ v. Shinseki
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) has embraced the Federal Circuit's decision in AZ and has given the holding effect in cases beyond sexual assault. In Helm v. Shinseki, the veteran, Helm, was seeking service-connection for hearing loss as a result of noise trauma during service. 196 The VA denied the claim due to lack of records documenting the hearing loss. 197 Specifically, Helm's statements of complaints of hearing loss were "not credible based on the lack of objective medical evidence of hearing loss or tinnitus until many years after service." 198 The court relied on two cases to reverse the Board of Veterans Appeal's denial. First, citing Horn v. Shinseki, the CAVC held that the "absence of evidence cannot be substantive negative evidence," unless a veteran first shows a proper foundation that would show that the lack of record "has a tendency to prove or disprove a relevant fact." 199 Next, referring to AZ, the court noted that "absence of documentation of a claimed sexual assault in service cannot be considered as evidence that the assault did not occur . . . ." 200 Therefore, the court in Helm, relying on these two cases, found that the Board improperly held that the lack of evidence in his medical records weighed negatively against his claim. 201 The CAVC remanded Helm's claim for reconsideration by the Board. 202 
B. AZ v. Shinseki and MKULTRA Victims
An MKULTRA victim should be permitted by the VA to avail themselves of AZ, its authorities, and subsequent cases because they are analogous scenarios: a veteran with an injury due to LSD experimentation, but without proof, is much like a veteran who lacks evidence of his or her sexual assault.
The first hurdle for MKULTRA victims is proving when, where, and how they were unwittingly dosed with LSD. Unfortunately, whether documents exist that could illuminate a particular veteran's claim, such as the list of names alluded to in the Congressional Hearing with Admiral Turner, is unclear. 203 There is no exact precedent to show what the Court has done, or would do, in this situation, but there are some analogies we can draw based on other factual scenarios. In Boggs v. West, the veteran alleged harm not from his time in-service, but rather as a result of VA treatment. 204 In 1966, he was admitted to a VA hospital due to "reactive depression with severe anxiety, mild hysterical features, and excessive use of denial." 205 One year later, the veteran "consented to participation in an investigational study of the use of the drug LSD." 206 Two years later, the veteran was given a follow-up examination and was diagnosed with "chronic severe anxiety reaction." 207 While the veteran stated he did not want to continue the program after one dose, he alleged that VA physicians continued to administer doses of LSD without his consent. 208 His doctors supported the conclusion that his later diagnosis of organic brain syndrome in 1981 was indicative of "post-LSD syndrome," but the VA nonetheless denied the claim. 209 The CAVC asserted that pre-existing conditions and alcoholism contributed to his condition, not LSD. 210 The CAVC also found it "highly probative" that there was no evidence after the administration of LSD that the veteran suffered any ill effects in terms of employability, or effects to his central nervous system. 211 The CAVC affirmed the Board's decision based on the idea that the veteran consented to LSD experimentation, that he had a pre-existing condition when entering the VA system, and that the "preponderance of the evidence shows that the veteran did not incur a superimposed disability as the result of VA medical treatment in 1967."
212
A second relevant case is Arista v. Shinseki, decided in 2011. 213 The veteran was a munitions systems specialist on active duty from 1987 to 1992. 214 The veteran had filed a claim for service-connection for PTSD, but was not able to substantiate his stressor because his mission was classified. 215 The Board decided that he had not submitted "specific enough information" of his stressors. 216 While the veteran was able to submit a document that was stamped "4-SECRET," he was not able to provide enough evidence to convince the VA of his claimed stressors. 217 The VA continued to request records, but the veteran was not able to provide any and, in October 2006, stated, "I can't give you buddy letters because the guys I worked with can't say anything either." 218 The CAVC affirmed the Board's denial of the veteran's claim for PTSD.
219
These two cases demonstrate that an MKULTRA victim today would have a difficult time surmounting the VA's burden of proof. First, because the program aimed to recruit prisoners and hospitalized patients with prior drug addictions, later disabilities may be assumed to be a result of pre-existing conditions, not a result of LSD dosing. be difficult to prove in a medical document, such as a letter connecting the illness to the LSD, especially if a veteran is only aware that he or she was given LSD once.
Lastly, as the Arista case demonstrates, the veteran must be able to access classified records in order to substantiate his claim.
221
In Arista, the veteran was not able to obtain the records that he required and was denied his benefits, even though it is not clear if records about his injury and actions would have been kept. 222 However, in the case of MKULTRA, records were kept, but often ordered to be destroyed by program directors. 223 Moreover, there are probably documents related to MKULTRA that are still classified. 224 Due to the potential impossibility of an MKULTRA victim obtaining records, the question becomes is AZ expansive enough to allow a veteran who was subjected to MKULTRA to recover benefits without vital documents?
If a veteran wanted to obtain service-connection benefits for receiving unwitting dosages of LSD during service under MKULTRA, the veteran will not be able to obtain sufficient records to prove that he/she was a test subject. In light of the absence of records, a veteran should be able to use AZ to demonstrate that the lack of records is not probative evidence that the veteran was not used as a test subject in MKULTRA. 225 However, it is important to note that the holding in AZ was specific to instances of sexual assault, so courts may be unwilling to extend the holding to LSD exposure under MKULTRA.
226
Unreleased documents, or documents destroyed by the government, are analogous to records that would not have been kept or recorded in the first place. Both of these scenarios create situations where the veteran is not able to substantiate his claim because he is not able to prove his in-service injury or harm. AZ bridged the gap for records that would not have existed, and it should also bridge the gap for records that the government destroyed or refuses to release. 221 See Arista, 2011 WL 6004121, at *6-7. 222 Id. at *2-4. 223 See Project MKULTRA, supra note 37, at 403-04. 224 See also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 181 (1985) (holding that the Freedom of Information Act allowed the Director of the CIA to withhold information regarding the research institutions involved in MKULTRA). Sims is yet another obstacle that a veteran must overcome if he seeks documents regarding testing at institutions where the veteran may have been stationed during the time of the program. In the event that Sims bars a veteran from obtaining documents, AZ should alleviate the burden of absent records. See AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 225 See AZ, 731 F.3d at 1318. 226 Id.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the policy considerations enumerated in AZ, regarding Congress's legislative intent in creating the VA disability system, the "relaxed evidentiary requirements" are supposed to promote a veteran-friendly and non-adversarial system. 227 Moreover, AZ also stated that, to deny a claim based on evidence that would not have been kept, would not "comport with a system in which 'the importance of systemic fairness and the appearance of fairness carries great weight.'" 228 Therefore, in reliance on a system based on fairness to the veteran, military destruction of documents that would support a veteran's claim for a service-connection injury should not be held against that veteran or his claim. Even given the negative treatment of comparable scenarios in Boggs and Arista, AZ and Helm should overcome the evidentiary gaps. Therefore, MKULTRA victims should have at least a colorable argument against the VA as to why they deserve service-connection for currently suffered disabilities as a result of unwitting exposure to LSD by the government.
